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Abstract 
 
This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of Nash Bargaining Theory that 
may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players 
have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a 
second favours the other. The third is an apparently reasonable compromise, but is in fact 
precluded as an agreed choice by the axioms of Nash Bargaining Theory. Experimental 
results show that agreement on this third alternative occurs rather often. So the axiomatic 
Nash theory is not well-supported by our evidence. Our subjects’ behaviour could be 
interpreted as the paying of an irrationally (according to the Nash theory) high price in order 
to reach a compromise agreement. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper reports on an experimental investigation based on the following decision problem. 
There is a (desirable) prize that may be allocated to either of two individuals, J and K. The 
allocation is to be decided randomly, by drawing a coloured ball from an opaque bag. The 
prize goes to J if the drawn ball is yellow, and to K if blue. If the drawn ball is red, however, 
then they each receive nothing. The problem for J and K is that they have to agree which one 
of three bags is to be used for the draw, with contents as shown in Table 1. If they fail to do 
so then by default no draw occurs and they each receive nothing, an outcome we denote as z. 
 If they are both self-interested then J and K have opposing preferences, ex ante, over 
the three bags. Bag C, being the middle-ranked alternative for both partners, represents a 
compromise. However, this compromise comes at a price, in the form of the red ball. Five or 
more red balls in Bag C, yellows and blues being unchanged throughout, would be too high a 
price, in that both partners would be better off, ex ante, with either of Bags A and B (and 
thus, of course, C would no longer be a compromise). We can say that, in that case, 
agreement on Bag C would be collectively irrational for the two partners.1 But what if, as 
here, Bag C contains only one red ball? Is this an irrationally high price to pay for the 
compromise?  
 It would be so if J and K could bindingly agree to toss a coin to decide between Bags A 
and B, since this would give them each, ex ante, a 50% chance of winning the prize. It would 
similarly be so if they could agree to share the prize afterwards, either by direct division or 
indirectly through side-payments or further randomisation, since each of Bags A and B 
delivers with certainty the prize thereby to be shared. But suppose that neither type of 
agreement is possible, so that the only options for J and K are just as initially described. 
                                                          
1 This has to be distinguished from individual rationality. If agreement and thus the avoidance of z requires 
unanimous individual assent, then each partner assenting to C is an equilibrium in individual strategies, even 
with five or more red balls. 
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Might they then reasonably agree to choose the costly compromise in the form of Bag C? Our 
conjecture was that reasonable, self-interested people probably would do so. However, as we 
show in Section 2, such an agreement is precluded by the standard axioms of Nash 
Bargaining Theory, according to which just one red ball is indeed too high a price to pay.  
 This provides the basis for an experimental test of the Nash theory, and in Sections 3 
and 4 we report on just such an experiment. Other than at a very abstract level, the decision 
problem at the centre of this experiment has little resemblance to any real-world bargaining 
problem. This is typical of experimentation, as in the familiar tests of Expected Utility theory 
based on Common-Ratio or Allais-type individual decision problems. Our experimental 
design reflects a prior conjecture that, in a similarly contrived situation, subjects will behave 
in a way that violates the Nash theory. In itself the experiment does not provide any 
explanation of such behaviour,2 or reveal which of the component axioms of the theory is 
thereby violated. It stands only as a test of the theory as a whole. 
 The value of such a test depends on its novelty and strength, and on the currency of the 
theory in question. As noted in Section 2, Nash Bargaining Theory has been subject to 
previous experimental testing, with broadly unfavourable results. As a pure theory of 
bargaining it has been largely superseded, although probably more for conceptual than 
empirical reasons, by a non-cooperative game theoretic approach. As with Expected Utility, 
however, the Nash theory is still commonly employed in economic modelling,3 thus 
justifying its continued testing. Furthermore, as explained in Section 2, our test is not only 
novel but also relatively strong, in that it is directed at a relatively weak version of the theory. 
 
 
                                                          
2 The manifest attraction of Bag C is its ex ante fairness; hence our prior conjecture. But our purpose here is not 
to elaborate or test theories of fairness. Simply, whatever the attraction of Bag C it is ineligible as an agreed 
choice according to the Nash axioms.   
3 Recent examples include Shimer (2005) and Atakani (2006).  
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2. Collective Rationality in the Costly Compromise Problem 
Define a Costly Compromise Problem (CCP) where, for given parameters 12π ( ,1)∈  and 
1
2γ (1 , )∈ −π , and a given prospective prize P, individuals J and K have to agree a choice 
from three alternative “bags” (or equivalent devices) as defined in Table 2. Thus Table 1 
represents a CCP with 0.75π =  and 0.4γ = . The general definition makes no assumption 
about the correlation between J winning and K winning.  Section 1 describes a CCP in which 
these events are mutually exclusive. But we can allow for a variation in which for each 
partner an independent draw, with replacement, is to be made from the agreed bag, with the 
implied possibility of them each winning P.  
 Let ˆ (1 )π ≡ π −π , where necessarily 12ˆ (1 , )π∈ −π . In Table 1, for example, we have 
ˆ 0.43π ≈ . Our central proposition is that if ˆγ < π , as in Table 1, then Nash Bargaining Theory 
rules out Bag C as an agreed choice in the CCP.  
 For an indicative demonstration of this, consider the Nash Product. In abstract, a two-
person bargaining problem comprises a set of available alternatives X, each of which is 
weakly preferred by both bargaining partners to some given default outcome d. Nash’s 
axioms together require the existence of some (0,1)ρ∈  such that the agreed choice Xx∈  
maximises the Nash Product: 4 
 1N( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]j kx u x u x
ρ −ρ=  (1) 
where ( )ju x and ( )ku x  are the two partners’ individual vNM utilities, each normalised to 
zero at d.  
                                                          
4  There are some important riders to this assertion. Firstly, the Nash theory does not require that individual 
utilities are vNM, but only that they have the same degree of cardinality as vNM, as implied by the axiom of 
Invariance. In the present context, however, vNM is a natural interpretation. Secondly, Nash (1950) included an 
axiom of Symmetry, in effect implying additionally that 12ρ = ; the non-symmetric generalisation was provided 
by Kalai (1977). Thirdly, conventional analysis would restrict X to having a compact, convex image in utility 
space, guaranteeing a unique argmax of (1). Zhou (1997) generalised to a class of non-convex cases, but not 
including the CCP. So the theoretical foundation of our appeal to the Nash Product in this context is not 
completely secure, which is why we describe this as only an indicative demonstration.   
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 The CCP is a two-person bargaining problem with d z=  and X={A,B,C}, taking as 
given the prospective prize P and the probability parameters { , }π γ . Here vNM utilities may 
be normalised to: 
   ( ) 0ju z =   (A)ju = π   (B) 1ju = −π  (C)ju = γ   
   ( ) 0ku z =   (A) 1ku = −π  (B)ku = π   (C)ku = γ   
so that, for any given ρ: 
  1N(A) (1 )ρ −ρ= π −π   1N(B) (1 )ρ −ρ= −π π   N(C) = γ   (2) 
Evidently N(C) N(A)≥  and N(C) N(B)≥  together imply that 2 (1 )γ ≥ π −π . Given ˆγ < π , 
therefore, there is no value of ρ for which Bag C maximises the Nash Product.5  
 We can show more explicitly the sense in which agreement on Bag C is collectively 
irrational, in terms of the Nash axioms. For any bargaining problem, given the partners and 
their individual preferences, define the eligible subset (X, ) XdΓ ⊆ . This is analogous (or 
reduces) to the set of most-preferred alternatives in the case of individual choice,6 with the 
following three axioms analogously interpretable as conditions of (collective) rationality. 
Non-emptiness   (X, )dΓ  is non-empty. 
Efficiency    (X, )x d∉Γ  if there exists some Xy∈  strictly preferred to x by 
each partner. 
                                                          
5 In fact we could relax the assumption that the individuals are self-interested, at least where J winning and K 
winning are mutually exclusive. Suppose that J and K have identical vNM preferences under which the utility 
value of one’s self winning is 1, of the other person winning is [0,1]α∈  , and of no-one winning is 0. Then 
N(C) N(A)≥  and N(C) N(B)≥  together imply that : 
  2 2
[ (1 )][1 ]
(1 )
π+ α −π −π + απγ ≥ + α  
If 0α >  then the right hand side of this condition is strictly greater than (1 )π −π , so that for the Nash value to 
be maximised by Bag C requires a higher value of γ , i.e. fewer red balls, than if 0α = . In this sense, therefore, 
altruism makes the agreed choice of Bag C less rationalisable within the Nash theory. This result may appear 
counter-intuitive, but is easily understood by considering the case 1α =  where each player cares only that 
someone, rather than no-one, wins the prize. Here, both J and K are indifferent between Bags A and B, each of 
which delivers the prize to someone for sure, and they both prefer either of these to Bag C with its attendant 
possibility of no-one winning. 
6 In the case of individual choice we would expect the eligible subset not to vary with d, the default outcome in 
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Consistency   (X, )x d∉Γ  if there exists some Xy∈  and Y X⊃  such that 
(Y, )x d∉Γ  and (Y, )y d∈Γ . 
Consistency here corresponds to Assumption 7 in Nash (1950), subsequently named 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.7 
 Now consider a hypothetical variant on the CCP in which J and K have to agree not 
only a choice of bag but also, at the same time, a choice of prize from Q and R, over which 
they have opposing preferences. Specifically, given π we can hypothesise prizes Q and R 
such that: 
   ˆ[Q, ] [R, ]jπ ∼ π   and  ˆ[R, ] [Q, ]kπ ∼ π  (3) 
where [P, ]ϕ  denotes the prospect of winning P with probability φ, otherwise winning 
nothing. If J and K each have preferences conforming to Expected Utility (EU) theory, then 
(3) implies additionally that: 
   ˆ[Q,1 ] [R, ]j−π ∼ π  and  ˆ[R ,1 ] [Q, ]k−π ∼ π  (4) 
since the two probabilities in each prospect-pair have a common ratio throughout. 
 We are here considering, in effect, a two-person bargaining problem with d z=  and 
Q Q Q R R RX={A ,B ,C ,A ,B ,C }, the subscripts indicating the variable prize. Now, if ˆγ < π  then 
for both partners: 
   ,ˆ[Q, ] [Q, ]j kπ γf   and  ,ˆ[R, ] [R, ]j kπ γf  (5) 
It follows from (3), (4) and (5) that QC  and RC  are both Pareto-dominated, the former by RA  
and the latter by QB . Efficiency therefore requires that Bag C is ineligible here, whatever the 
agreed choice of prize, if ˆγ < π . 
 Next decompose this hypothetical problem into its two constituent CCPs. In each of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the event of failure to choose.  
7 The correspondence between our axioms and the standard Nash axioms is blurred by specification of the latter 
being within the framework of a (unique) bargaining solution defined in utility space. Our alternative framework 
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these J and K have to agree a choice from {A,B,C} with the same { , }π γ  values as in the 
composite problem, but with the prize in each case being given, respectively, as Q and R. In 
the composite problem, with QC  and RC  both ineligible Non-emptiness requires that at least 
one of Q Q R R{A ,B ,A ,B }  is eligible. So Consistency implies that in their respective constituent 
CCPs at least one QC  and RC  is ineligible. 
 Thus for any { , }π γ  values such that ˆγ < π  there exists at least one, albeit hypothetical, 
CCP in which the agreed choice of Bag C is precluded by the above three axioms of 
collective rationality. Now add a fourth, more context-specific, axiom:8 
Prize-Independence   In any CCP, the eligibility of each bag depends only on the 
values of { , }π γ . 
It then follows that Bag C is ineligible in any CCP with ˆγ < π , irrespective of the prize at 
stake, which is what we sought to demonstrate .  
 In the next section we describe an experiment designed to test this specific implication 
of the Nash theory, i.e., that Bag C cannot be the agreed choice in a CCP if ˆγ < π . As is 
evident from the axiomatic argument, in effect this is a joint test of a number of assumptions. 
It may be thought that such an exercise is superfluous, given the prior existence of adverse 
experimental evidence on some of these assumptions individually. Most obviously, the 
assumption of EU preferences, by which we derived (4) from (3), is contradicted by a long 
record of experimental findings.9 However, for our purposes this assumption is unnecessarily 
strong. The axiomatic argument would still go through if (4) was weakened to: 
   ˆ[Q,1 ] [R, ]j−π π?  and  ˆ[R ,1 ] [Q, ]k−π π?  
which, in conjunction with (3), would be consistent not only with EU but also with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
provides for a relatively simple and direct explanation of the ineligibility (given ˆγ < π ) of Bag C in the CCP. 
8 This axiom would follow from the Nash construction of a bargaining solution being defined in utility space, 
given that these are vNM utilities (see note 4 above). 
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common-ratio violation of EU, regularly observed under experimental conditions, whereby 
an individual’s preference for the riskier prospect (i.e., that with the preferred prize but lower 
probability of winning) over the safer is inversely related to the overall probability levels. 
 Similarly, consider the axiom of Prize-Independence. This is reflected in the Nash 
Products (2) which, like the vNM utility values on which they are based, are independent of 
the prize at stake. Indeed, these utility values would be the same even if there were different 
prizes in prospect for each partner. Thus in our definition of a CCP we can allow the more 
general possibility that J KP [P ,P ]=  is a pair of prizes, with JP  awarded to J in the event that J 
wins, and likewise KP  to K. Both demonstrations of the ineligibility of Bag C, given ˆγ < π , 
go through without amendment. However, there is prior evidence to suggest that Prize-
Independence would be violated, empirically, for some CCPs of this type. In a series of 
experiments by Roth and various associates,10 a monetary prize was allocated by lottery to 
one of two partners, who had to agree in advance how to divide a given total of lottery tickets 
between themselves. In treatments where it was common knowledge that the partners faced 
different prizes, compensating unequal divisions of tickets were regularly agreed, with the 
effect of equalizing expected monetary values. Equivalent behaviour in a CCP would be for J 
and K to agree a choice of Bag A given common knowledge of P [£ ,£ (1 )]y y= π −π , but 
Bag B given P [£ (1 ) ,£ ]y y= −π π , each partner having an expected return of £y throughout. 
The behaviour of Roth’s subjects could be interpreted in terms of fairness or of focal points. 
Either way, it casts doubt on the predictive power of the Nash theory, and in particular Prize-
Independence. 
 To avoid our axiomatic argument, and thus our experiment, being vitiated by Roth’s 
findings we can simply restrict our definition of a CCP. One possibility is to require, for a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 Camerer (1995) provides an excellent survey. 
10 Two key references are Roth and Malouf (1979) and Roth and Murnighan (1982). For full references and an 
overview, see pp. 40-49 of Roth (1995). 
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CCP, that if J KP P≠  then the prizes are not common knowledge. Another is to require 
(common knowledge) that J KP [P ,P ]=  is envy-free, i.e., that neither partner strictly prefers 
the other’s prize to their own. The form of CCP used in our experiment satisfies the first of 
these conditions and can be interpreted as also satisfying the second. 
  In summary, therefore, the hypothesis that ˆγ < π  makes Bag C ineligible in the 
CCP follows from a relatively weak version of Nash Bargaining Theory, the testing of which 
does not appear to have been pre-empted by already existing empirical evidence. 
  
3. The Experiment 
In designing the experiment a central concern was to prevent collusive agreements of the type 
described in Section 1. Thus we required our subjects to negotiate anonymously and via 
computer, and with minimal exploitable information about the value of the prize in prospect, 
which could differ between partners.  
 The experiment was conducted in the EXEC laboratory at the University of York, the 
subjects being undergraduate and postgraduate students. There were four experimental 
treatments, as will shortly be described. For each treatment there were two separate sessions, 
each lasting around 45 minutes and employing a group of sixteen new subjects seated at 
individual computer terminals. Apart from oral instructions, pre-recorded and played back to 
the whole group, the session was carried out in silence with subjects communicating only 
with or via the computer. The principal off-screen instructions are presented in Appendix A, 
and can usefully be read now. 
 In the main part (“Part 2”) of the experiment the sixteen subjects were randomly and 
anonymously paired. Each pair had to agree a choice of bag. This process was repeated in 
each of three further rounds, with re-matching of partners in such a way as to avoid cross-
contamination by previous matches. In each round, the two partners negotiated within a 
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structured protocol of alternating offers. The partner randomly designated as J (i.e., Yellow) 
opened by proposing one of the three bags, optionally accompanying the proposal with a 
brief message. K could either accept this proposal, thus ending the negotiations with 
agreement, or reject it. Rejection would trigger a computerised randomiser to determine 
whether the process would end at that stage in disagreement or could continue, with K 
making a counterproposal. Negotiations continued in this way until either a proposal was 
accepted, or the randomiser ended the process in disagreement. Appendix B shows a 
representative screenshot, in this case for a proposer about to compose a message to 
accompany the proposal of Bag A. The randomiser took the form of an onscreen spinning 
wheel, visible simultaneously to both partners, containing two sectors: green for continuation 
and red for termination. Immediately prior to being paired-up for the first round, individual 
subjects were given dummy screens so that they could practice making proposals and 
responses. In particular they were invited to spin the randomiser wheel as many times as they 
wanted, the aim being to give them confidence that it was genuine (which it was). 
 The practical purpose of a continuation probability 1θ <  was to keep negotiations to a 
manageable length. But for self-interested and rational subjects θ  is an important parameter. 
A sufficiently low value of θ  produces, in effect, an Ultimatum Game. If 1−π > θπ  then K 
will accept J’s proposal of Bag A, since the best that K could achieve otherwise is agreement 
on Bag B at the next stage, which occurs only with probability θ . So, given common 
knowledge of self-interest and rationality (CKSR), if (1 )θ < −π π  then the unique (non-
cooperative subgame-perfect Nash) equilibrium is agreement on Bag A or, more generally, 
the most-preferred bag of whoever is first proposer. 
 By contrast, a sufficiently high value of θ  produces a negotiation game in which 
agreement on any of the three Bags is sustainable as an equilibrium, given CKSR. Suppose 
that K’s strategy is always to propose, and to accept only, Bag B. Then J can do no better 
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than likewise to propose or accept B at any stage. It follows in turn that K’s strategy of 
accepting only B, and thus in particular of rejecting C, is rational if γ < θπ . So given this 
condition there is an equilibrium in which Bag B is the agreed choice, irrespective of who is 
first proposer. But by symmetric reasoning this same condition implies a second equilibrium 
in which both partners always propose/accept Bag A. Strategically therefore this resembles a 
one-off Chicken Game, having one equilibrium in which J defers to K, and another in which 
K defers to J. But with a sufficiently high θ  there is also an equilibrium in which Bag C is 
the agreed choice irrespective of who is first proposer. Suppose that K’s strategy is always to 
propose or accept C and to reject A. Given this, it is rational for J likewise always to propose 
or accept C. It is additionally rational for J always to reject B if 1−π < θγ . The two strategies 
here are symmetric, so this same condition rationalises K’s strategy, given J’s. Overall, 
therefore, if max[ , (1 ) ]θ > γ π −π γ  then for each of the three bags there exists (given CKSR) 
an equilibrium supporting agreement on that bag, and in each case irrespective of who is first 
proposer. If ˆγ < π  then the relevant condition is (1 )θ > −π γ ; if ˆγ > π  then it is θ > γ π . 11   
 As discussed in Section 2, our test of the Nash theory does not assume self-interest. 
However, in case subjects were self-interested it was important for a clean test that the 
bargaining protocol did not preclude agreement on any of the three bags as a strategic 
equilibrium. So our principal treatment had ˆγ < π  and (1 )θ > −π γ , the tested hypothesis 
being no C-agreements in these circumstances. But this framework also provided the 
opportunity for a symmetric test of CKSR strategic equilibrium: if ˆγ ≥ π  then agreement on 
any of the three bags is consistent with the Nash theory (without symmetry), but if in addition 
(1 )θ < −π π  then the unique CKSR strategic equilibrium is agreement on Bag A.  
                                                          
11 This reveals a connection between the Nash and strategic theories of bargaining. Given ˆγ < π , which in the 
Nash theory precludes agreement on Bag C, there is no value of θ at which agreement on C is the unique 
strategic equilibrium, whereas there are values of θ at which there is equilibrium agreement on each of A and B 
but not on C. For an extensive discussion of the relationship between these two theories of bargaining see 
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 These considerations suggested a 2×2 structure of treatments, which Table 3 
categorises in terms of parameters γ  and θ . Treatment 1 can be viewed as a control 
treatment; here any agreement is consistent with both the Nash theory and CKSR strategic 
equilibrium. In Treatment 2 any agreement is likewise consistent with CKSR equilibrium, but 
C-agreements are precluded by Nash. In Treatment 3 any agreement is consistent with Nash 
but only A-agreements are consistent with CKSR equilibrium. In Treatment 4 C-agreements 
are precluded by Nash, and only A-agreements are consistent with CKSR equilibrium. This 
treatment is theoretically gratuitous, and we must admit to including it mainly for aesthetic 
completeness. But, as it happens, it did provide some useful additional data. 
 In implementing these treatments we used bags in which the number of yellow and blue 
balls was double that shown in Table 1. Thus, as in Table 1, each treatment had 0.75π=  and 
ˆ 0.43π≈ . This doubling made possible Treatments 1 and 3, for which there was just one red 
ball in Bag C, corresponding to 0.44γ ≈ . For Treatments 2 and 4 there were two red balls, 
thus corresponding to 0.4γ =  just as in Table 1. The continuation probabilities were 0.85θ=  
for Treatments 1 and 2, and 0.15θ=  for Treatments 3 and 4, these values being comfortably 
within the required constraints indicated in Table 3. 
 To inhibit ex post sharing agreements, negotiation over the agreed choice of bag was 
carried out with both partners unaware not only of each others’ prospective prize but also of 
their own. We also wanted to make it difficult for partners to estimate expected values for 
these prizes, including from any prior communication with subjects from previous sessions. 
To this end we preceded the main part of the experiment with an individual decision problem 
(“Part 1”) in which each of the sixteen subjects privately nominated one of seven virtual 
boxes, labelled A-G. Each box contained £30 to be divided equally between all those subjects 
nominating it. The subject’s individual dividend from this process then became his (or her) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, ch4). 
 
13
prospective monetary prize in Part 2. There were two practice rounds, after each of which the 
distribution of nominations across the seven boxes was displayed on all screens, with the 
corresponding hypothetical dividend being shown individually and privately for each subject. 
The third round of nominations was for real. Each subject could of course infer his own 
dividend from the distribution of nominations in this round, and that information was indeed 
disclosed, simultaneously to all subjects, but not until the end of Part 2 when the negotiations 
had all been completed. After this, each subject was called separately, in turn, into the 
adjacent office, where he first drew a numbered ball from a bag to determine which of the 
four rounds in Part 2 was actually to count and be played out for real. If the indicated round 
was one in which he had failed to reach agreement with his partner, then he left with nothing. 
Otherwise he next drew a ball from the bag he had agreed in that round. If this ball matched 
his designated colour in that round, then he was paid his dividend, the value of which was 
known only to himself and the experimenter; otherwise he left with nothing.  
 
4. Results 
For each of the four treatments there were 32 subjects and 64 instances of a CCP (two 
sessions, each comprising four rounds, each matching eight pairs of subjects). The outcome 
of each CCP was either agreement on one of the bags {A,B,C} or else disagreement (z). By 
comparison with Table 3, which indicates the theoretical predictions, Figure 1 charts for each 
treatment the observed frequency of each outcome, aggregating over rounds and sessions.  
 The strong test of Nash Bargaining Theory is its implication of no C-agreements in 
Treatment 2. The theory clearly fails this test. There were 46 such agreements, comprising 
72% of all outcomes. A weaker test comparing Treatment 2 with Treatment 1 offers no 
mitigation, there being more, rather than fewer, C-agreements in Treatment 2. Furthermore, 
these C-agreements were less contentious than those in Treatment 1, in that proportionately 
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more of them (63% compared with 50%) were reached immediately, on the opening proposal 
by Partner J (Yellow). 
 At the individual level there is similarly little evidence in support of the Nash theory. 
Every one of the 32 individual subjects in Treatment 2 was party to at least one C-agreement 
over the four rounds. And there were very few messages, at any stage, expressing aversion to 
Bag C. Of the 57 proposals for Bag A or B throughout Treatment 2, 44 were accompanied by 
messages. Only five of these clearly referred, either directly or indirectly, to the red balls in 
Bag C. These five messages came from three different subjects, all in Session 2. One was 
Subject 5 whose pairing in Round 4 with Subject 15 produced the following brief negotiation: 
 
Treatment 2 Session 2 Round 4 
 
Pair 8
5 A no reds which are a waste for us 
 
 15 C we wont agree on the other 2 – 
reds are a fair price to pay for 
equality ! 
5 accept C     
 
In this respect there was little difference between the two treatments. Throughout Treatment 1 
there were 79 proposals for Bag A or B; 66 of these were accompanied by messages and, of 
these, only six expressed aversion to Bag C.12 
 Our secondary aim was to investigate the extent of self-interested rational behaviour. 
The strong test of CKSR strategic equilibrium is its implication of solely A-agreements in 
Treatment 3. The theory clearly fails this test: there were 12 A-agreements, comprising only 
19% of all outcomes. However, even this small number of A-agreements was significantly 
more than in Treatment 1, as a proportion both of outcomes (chi-squared 0.013p = ) and of 
agreements ( 0.006)=p . So the weaker test provides some support. Besides, in itself the 
strong test confirms only the absence of CKSR. In Treatment 3 a self-interested rational (SR) 
                                                          
12 A full transcript is available at: http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~jdb1/3johns/mk4tscript.pdf 
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subject will (SR1) accept whatever is proposed, and (SR2) propose the best for herself that 
her partner will accept. If she knows her partner to be SR, and therefore following SR1, then 
SR2 prescribes proposing her most-preferred bag. But if instead she believes it sufficiently 
likely that her partner would for some reason reject this, then proposing it would not be 
rational. So any number of C-agreements, or even B-agreements, here would be consistent 
with all individual subjects being self-interested and rational, but some of them being 
doubtful of this fact. 
 Nevertheless, one outcome here not consistent with strategic rationality (either self-
interested or altruistic) is disagreement, since this requires the rejection of a proposal and thus 
a violation of SR1. There were 16 disagreements in Treatment 3, from which we can infer 
that not all our subjects were SR. More precisely, an upper bound to the number of SR 
subjects is given by those who satisfied SR1 throughout, by not rejecting any proposal in any 
of the four rounds. There were 16 (out of 32) such subjects in Treatment 3, two of whom 
happened to be designated J (Yellow) in every round and as such received no proposals at all. 
 It is not clear simply from the outcomes what our non-SR subjects were up to. But the 
general predominance of C-agreements across all treatments suggests that at least some of 
them may have been motivated by the pursuit of compromise rather than self-interest. So a 
natural question is how many subjects systematically behaved in this way, throughout all four 
rounds of their session. Define as a Strategic Compromiser (SC) a subject who always 
proposes Bag C and always accepts Bag C. This is of course consistent with SR1. A stronger 
type (SC+) additionally never accepts his or her least-preferred bag (which in this treatment 
was usually Bag A), thus potentially violating SR1. In Treatment 3 there were eleven subjects 
meeting the criteria for SC, of whom nine also did so for SC+. Of these SC+ subjects, only 
one was so by default, never having received a proposal other than for Bag C. So there is 
evidence of systematic compromise-seeking, even to the individual’s own disadvantage, by 
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around one third of our subjects in Treatment 3. 
 Table 4 extends this analysis to all treatments. It also includes a count of subjects who 
were instead systematically avoiding compromise, whom we might expect to find especially 
in Treatments 2 and 4. Specifically, we define as a Strategic Non-compromiser (SN) a subject 
who never proposes Bag C, and a correspondingly stronger type (SN+) who additionally 
never accepts Bag C. Table 4 also records how many subjects satisfied the criteria for only 
one of SR, SC and SN. Note in particular that SR implies no specific prescriptions in 
Treatments 1 and 2, so that no subject can be ruled out as being SR here. 
 Treatment 4, as Figure 1 shows, was unique in producing more A-agreements than C-
agreements. An obvious question is whether this is evidence in favour of the Nash theory, 
which implies no C-agreements here, or of self-interested strategic rationality which, given 
common knowledge, implies solely A-agreements. With regard to the latter, a comparison 
with Treatment 2 is similar to the parallel comparison already made between Treatments 3 
and 1. We can confidently (chi-squared 0.001<p ) reject the hypothesis that the overall four-
outcome frequency is drawn from the same population as that of Treatment 2, there being 
significantly more A-agreements in Treatment 4 as a proportion both of outcomes and of 
agreements ( 0.001<p  in either case). To this extent Treatment 4 provides additional weak 
evidence for the presence of self-interested, rational subjects. Table 4 records that there could 
be up to twenty such subjects here, although only four of these could only have been SR, 
from even the limited range of strategy types considered here. 
 However, albeit less confidently ( 0.040)=p , we can also reject the hypothesis that the 
four-outcome frequency in Treatment 4 is drawn from the same population as that in 
Treatment 3, there being significantly fewer C-agreements in Treatment 4 as a proportion 
both of outcomes ( 0.033)=p  and of agreements ( 0.005)=p . Table 5 provides some 
additional detail, recording the opening proposals and responses in each round for each of 
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Treatments 3 and 4. The ratio of opening A-proposals to opening C-proposals, over all four 
rounds together, was substantially (1.6 compared with 0.7) and significantly ( 0.034)=p  
higher in Treatment 4 than in Treatment 3. The difference was particularly marked (3.7 
compared with 0.5, and 0.014=p ) in Round 1; in fact through the four rounds the number of 
opening A-proposals fell in Treatment 4 and rose in Treatment 3. Over all four rounds, the 
acceptance rate of A-proposals was higher in Treatment 4 than in Treatment 3 (66% 
compared with 46%), but not significantly so ( 0.127)=p . 
  So the additional red ball appears to have had some independent effect here, and in 
particular on the behaviour of proposers. One possibility is that subjects were more averse to 
Bag C as such, in accordance with the Nash theory. As Table 4 records, the number of SN 
subjects is at its highest in Treatment 4, and is almost double the number in Treatment 3. But 
of these eighteen SN subjects only five were SN+, and each of these was so by default, in that 
they never received a proposal of Bag C. In fact only one subject in Treatment 4 actually 
rejected Bag C at any stage (compared with three such subjects in Treatment 3), and this 
subject twice accepted Bag C in other rounds.  
 Table 6 provides some partial additional evidence. It lists all the opening A-proposals 
and C-proposals in Round 1 of Treatments 3 and 4, with individuals identified by 
session:subject numbers. Alongside each proposal is shown the accompanying message, if 
any (three of which have been abbreviated for this table, as indicated by “…”). Also shown is 
that subject’s possible strategy type(s) as classified on the basis of proposals and responses 
over the whole session. The messages accompanying C-proposals are all rather similar, 
generally appealing in some way to equality and/or fairness. Those accompanying A-
proposals are less uniform. We interpret those in Treatment 3 as pointing out the strategic 
situation to the receiver. In Treatment 4 there are also a couple of messages of that type (from 
1:16 and 2:4)  but most messages accompanying A-proposals here appear relatively vacuous, 
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in simply stating the nature of the proposal and/or urging or requesting its acceptance. This 
pattern is broadly repeated in subsequent rounds, with vacuous messages accompanying A-
proposals generally outnumbering strategic ones. But noticeably absent are any messages 
explicitly expressing aversion to Bag C. Indeed, of the 37 messages throughout Treatment 4 
accompanying proposals of Bag A or Bag B, none at all referred to the red balls in Bag C or 
to the absence of them in Bags A or B. 
 So it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about what accounts for the relatively low 
number of C-Agreements and high number of A-agreements in Treatment 4. But in our view 
the evidence does not favour the Nash theory. Instead it appears to be more consistent with a 
simpler explanation – that, in the absence of CKSR, the additional red ball caused SR 
subjects to be more optimistic, especially at the outset of the session, that their opening A-
proposals would be accepted. To that extent Treatment 4 provides additional indication that a 
considerable number of our subjects were rationally pursuing their own self interest. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Nash Bargaining Theory rests on axioms of collective rationality. We investigated an 
implication of these axioms that seems to be counterintuitive: bargaining pairs should reject 
what appears to be a reasonable compromise. In our experimental test we found instead that 
the majority of bargaining pairs reached agreement on this compromise. So the Nash theory 
fails our test. We also extended our experimental framework to incorporate a symmetric test 
of self-interested individual rationality. We found clear evidence that not all individuals are 
self-interested and strategically rational, and evidence of the systematic pursuit of 
compromise by some individuals, even to their own disadvantage. However this latter 
behaviour was by no means universal or even predominant, and there is suggestive evidence 
of the rational pursuit of self-interest by many, if not most, of our subjects. 
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TABLE 1 
THE THREE BAGS 
 Bag A Bag B Bag C 
yellow balls 3 1 2 
blue balls 1 3 2 
red balls 0 0 1 
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TABLE 2 
THE GENERAL COSTLY COMPROMISE PROBLEM 
 Bag A Bag B Bag C 
Prob[J wins] π  1− π  γ  
Prob[K wins] 1− π  π  γ  
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TABLE 3 
THE FOUR TREATMENTS IN THE EXPERIMENT 
 ˆγ > π  ˆγ < π  
1max ,⎡ ⎤γ −πθ > ⎢ ⎥π γ⎣ ⎦  
Treatment 1 
 
Nash: any bag 
 
CKSR: any bag 
 
Treatment 2 
 
Nash: not Bag C 
 
CKSR: any bag 
 
1−πθ < π  
Treatment 3 
 
Nash: any bag 
 
CKSR: Bag A 
 
Treatment 4 
 
Nash: not Bag C 
 
CKSR: Bag A 
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TABLE 4 
POSSIBLE STRATEGY TYPES (OUT OF 32 SUBJECTS IN EACH TREATMENT) 
 
 consistent with consistent only with 
 SR SC SC+ SN SN+ none SR SC SN 
Treatment 1 32 8 8 8 1 0 16 0 0 
Treatment 2 32 9 9 4 0 0 18 0 0 
Treatment 3 16 11 9 10 2 5 7 7 3 
Treatment 4 20 9 4 18 5 4 4 3 3 
 
 
 
24
TABLE 5 
OPENING PROPOSALS AND RESPONSES IN TREATMENTS 3 AND 4 
 
  Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
  A B C A B C 
proposed 5 1 10 11 2 3 
R1 
accepted 3 1 9 6 2 3 
proposed 6 1 9 10 1 5 
R2 
accepted 3 1 8 7 0 5 
proposed 6 0 10 8 2 6 
R3 
accepted 2 - 9 4 2 5 
proposed 9 0 7 6 2 8 
R4 
accepted 4 - 6 6 2 8 
proposed 26 2 36 35 7 22 
all 
accepted 12 2 32 23 6 21 
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FIGURE 1 
OUTCOME FREQUENCIES BY TREATMENT (n=64 IN EACH TREATMENT)
Treatment 3
0.19
0.03
0.53
0.25
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A B C z
Treatment 4
0.36
0.09
0.34
0.20
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A B C z
Treatment 1
0.05
0.13
0.66
0.17
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A B C z
Treatment 2
0.03 0.08
0.72
0.17
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A B C z
 
27
APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Initial (pre-recorded) oral instructions prior to Part 1 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. We hope that you will enjoy it. If you have a 
mobile phone with you, please check now that it is switched off. [pause] 
The experiment requires you to make a few simple decisions which, together with a 
random factor, will determine the amount you are paid at the end of the session.  
There are sixteen participants in this session, all facing the same decisions and 
receiving the same instructions. Beside your terminal you have an envelope, some blank 
paper, and a pen. Please do not open the envelope until instructed to do so. The pen and paper 
are provided should you wish to keep a record of your decisions, although it is not necessary 
to do this. Please leave the pen here at the end of the session. 
The session is in two parts. Decisions in Part 1 will determine an amount of money 
which we will call your dividend. This amount may vary from one individual to another. 
However, whether or not you receive your dividend will depend on Part 2, where you 
will have to agree some decisions with other participants. We will give you further details on 
this at the start of Part 2. 
You will receive instructions both orally, like this, and also on the computer screen. In 
addition, at all times there will be an information bar at the bottom of the screen. This will 
remind you what action needs to be taken at that time. 
You will have opportunities to ask questions should the instructions not be clear to 
you. Otherwise, however, you must remain silent throughout the session. At various times 
you may have to wait for other participants to complete their decisions. If so, please be 
patient. 
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Before we proceed to Part 1, are there any questions?  [pause]   
Please click the Start button now. Read the onscreen information and then wait for 
further instructions.  [pause] 
Your task in Part 1 is simply to choose one of the seven boxes. Each box contains 
£30, to be shared equally among the participants choosing that box. There will be three 
rounds. The first two are for practice only, and will not count. But the third round is for real, 
and will determine your dividend. 
There will be no further oral instructions until Part 1 is completed. Are there any 
questions?  [pause] 
Please make your first practice selection now and then follow onscreen instructions 
until Part 1 is complete. 
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(Pre-recorded) oral instructions prior to Part 2 
Part 1 is now complete. Your dividend has been computed, but will not be revealed to 
you until the end of the session. 
We will now proceed to Part 2, which consists of four rounds. In each round the 
computer will pair you, at random, with another participant. It will designate one of you as 
Yellow and the other as Blue. The pair of you have to agree a decision, which will be 
explained shortly. You will then be assigned a new partner for the next round, and so on. 
Thus, after four rounds, you will have agreed four decisions, each with a different 
partner. However, only one of these four agreements will actually count for you. 
At the end of the session, each participant will be paid individually in private, in the 
adjoining office. So no other participant will know what payment you receive, unless you 
yourself choose to reveal it to them afterwards.  
Your payment will be determined as follows. Firstly you will draw a number from 1 
to 4, from this bag. This will select which of the four rounds in Part 2 is to count for you. 
Your color, either Yellow or Blue, will be as designated in your selected round. Then you 
will draw a ball from this bag, which will contain some yellow and blue balls, and possibly 
some red balls. If you draw your designated color, then you will be paid your dividend. 
Otherwise you will be paid nothing. 
We have not yet told you how many balls of each color will be in your bag. In fact, 
this is the decision you have to agree with your partner. The contents of your bag will be as 
agreed by you and your partner in your selected round. 
The envelope contains a summary of the information so far. Please open it now and 
read the summary. [pause]  
You may consult the summary again at any time during Part 2.  
In each round you will communicate with your partner only via the computer. Instructions for 
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doing this will appear on your screen. Are there any questions? [pause] 
Please click the Continue button now. The next few screens give you further details 
on Part 2, and enable you to practice communicating with your partner. Please note that for 
the purpose of these practice screens you will be communicating with yourself, as if you were 
your own partner. 
Please read and follow the instructions, continuing through the practice screens in 
your own time. [pause] 
Are there any questions? [pause] 
Then please begin Part 2 now. 
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Written summary information, provided prior to Part 2 
Part 1 
Your dividend is determined. It will be revealed to you after Part 2. 
Part 2 
 Round 1  The computer randomly assigns you a partner, and designates one of 
you as Yellow and the other as Blue. You and your partner agree the 
contents of the bag. 
 Round 2  The computer randomly assigns you a new partner, and designates 
one of you as Yellow and the other as Blue. You and your partner 
agree the contents of the bag. 
 Round 3  The computer randomly assigns you a new partner, and designates 
one of you as Yellow and the other as Blue. You and your partner 
agree the contents of the bag. 
 Round 4  The computer randomly assigns you a new partner, and designates 
one of you as Yellow and the other as Blue. You and your partner 
agree the contents of the bag. 
Payment 
You are paid individually and privately in the office, as follows.... 
You select one round (1-4) at random. Your color (Yellow or Blue) is as designated in that 
round, and the contents of your bag are as agreed with your partner in that round. 
You draw a ball from your bag. If it is your designated color, then you are paid your 
dividend. Otherwise you are paid nothing. 
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APPENDIX B 
SCREENSHOT FROM EXPERIMENT 
 
 
